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Following the tragic events of 11 September 2001,
Samuel Huntington's theory of a 'clash of civiliza-
tions' has been garnering greater currency. Whereas
it was roundly condemned in 1993 as a new manifes-
tation of Orientalism, in today's post-11 September
world it is hailed as having 'lasting importance'.1
Such dangerous thinking is now beginning to per-
vade presentations of Iranian-American relations,
distorting the reality that conflict between Iran and
the United States is a result of conflicting interests,
not cultures.
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To test the credibility of Professor Hunting-
ton's theory based solely on one case study
– Iranian-American relations – would be un-
wise. Moreover, to view Iranian-American
relations through the lens of Huntington's
theory simply because Iran and the US are
predominantly Muslim and Christian na-
tions, respectively, is equally ill-advised. A
more accurate understanding of Iranian-
American relations after 11 September
emerges from an examination of Washing-
ton and Tehran's concurring and conflicting
interests in West Asia. 
Today, Iran and the US enjoy two signifi-
cant mutual interests in West Asia. The first
is containing Saddam Hussein's regime in
Iraq. Iran has long competed with its west-
ern neighbour for hegemony in the region.
In an effort to strike a fatal blow at a weak-
ened post-revolutionary Iran, Iraq led the
two states into a bloody eight-year war in
the 1980s. Mutual suspicion lingers be-
tween Tehran and Baghdad as both govern-
ments continue to harbour each other's op-
position groups and develop weapons of
mass destruction (WMD). 
Iran's second mutual interest with the US
is in supporting an independent Afghan-
istan, free from Pakistani and Saudi-backed
'Muslim Fascists'2 like A l - Q aci d a and the Tal-
iban. Iran's highly porous 936-kilometre
border with Afghanistan is a source of inse-
curity for Tehran because of a constant flow
of Afghan refugees (now nearly two million)
and drugs into Iran from its eastern neigh-
bour. The drug trade across this border has
transformed Iran's eastern provinces into a
lawless region where, in the year 2000
alone, 1,500 fire-fights broke out between
Iranian security forces and drug traffickers.
In the last twenty years 3,000 Iranian troops
have died on the border with Afghanistan.3
Consequently, Iran seeks a friendly govern-
ment in Kabul willing to cooperate in ensur-
ing the security of this border. Viewing the
Taliban as the long arm of its regional rivals
– Pakistan and Saudi Arabia – Iran sought to
push back Taliban forces from its strategi-
cally important border with Afghanistan. 
As competing regional players, the US
and Iran suffer from three conflicting inter-
ests in West Asia: control over Afghanistan,
the proliferation of WMD, and the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. Afghanistan is today at
the centre of a competition between Iran
and the US for strategic dominance in Cen-
tral Asia. The view from Tehran is increas-
ingly one of a fortressed Iran, facing hostile
American forces to the west, south and
east. In all, 50,000 American military per-
sonnel surround Iran in an arc sweeping
from Incerlik in southern Turkey to Bishkek
in eastern Kyrgyzstan.4 For Washington, a
presence in Afghanistan is not desirable
but necessary in order to deny Afghan hos-
pitality to A l - Q aci d a and to ensure the sta-
bility of the Interim Government in Kabul.
CIA Director George Tenet highlighted this
clash of interests when he warned the US
Congress in February 2002 that Iran is
'countering the US presence' in Afghan-
istan because of 'deep-seated suspicions
among Tehran's clerics that the United
States is committed to encircling and over-
throwing them.'5
Today there are four nuclear actors – Is-
rael, Pakistan, the Russian Federation and
the US – and one near-nuclear actor – Iraq –
in Iran's region. Iranian security planners
would be remiss to ignore a future where
one or more of these powers could threaten
Iran with WMD. Consequently, Iran is devel-
oping its WMD capabilities to a point at
which if faced with a WMD-armed aggressor
it could brandish its own deterrent. For the
US a nuclear Iran would inhibit American
freedom of action in West Asia and limit
Washington's leverage over Tehran. 
The final conflicting interest between Iran
and the US is over the Israel-Palestine con-
flict. Just as the US has long enjoyed a 'spe-
cial relationship' with Zionism, so the Islam-
ic Republic has consistently supported the
Palestinian liberation movement. These two
relationships may have more to do with do-
mestic politics in both the US and Iran than
with external factors. Nonetheless, Iran con-
tinues to support anti-Zionist liberation
movements in Palestine and Lebanon and
the US continues to provide Israel with
diplomatic, economic and military assis-
tance. 
Resisting pressures
The concurring and conflicting interests
outlined above have driven Iranian-Ameri-
can relations since 11 September. Although
Iran did not publicly support Washington's
'War on Terror', it closed its border with
Afghanistan, denied fleeing A l - Q aci d a a n d
Taliban safe haven in Iran, promised to res-
cue any American soldiers in distress in its
territory, and allowed American humanitari-
an relief to be transported across its territo-
ry to Afghanistan. This tacit agreement be-
tween Tehran and Washington was a result
of negotiations between the two capitals on
24 and 25 September, through two interme-
diaries: the British Foreign Secretary, then
visiting Tehran, and the Swiss Ambassador
to Iran, then visiting Washington. This coop-
eration culminated in the handshake be-
tween US Secretary of State Colin Powell
and Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi
at a UN discussion on Afghanistan on 12 No-
v e m b e r .6
Predictably, this agreement collapsed at
the beginning of 2002. As US civilian and
military personnel began to establish an
American footprint in Afghanistan, con-
cerns were raised regarding Iranian interfer-
ence with Washington's plans for post-Tal-
iban Afghanistan. Although Iran had coop-
erated with the Bonn Conference that es-
tablished Hamed Karzai's Interim Afghan
Government, President Bush demanded on
11 January that Iran refrain from interfering
in Afghanistan.7
This was followed by Bush's 29 January
State of the Union (SOTU) address in which
he identified Iran as part of an 'axis of evil'.
Despite this swipe at Iran, Iranian leaders
have persisted in trying to engage Washing-
ton without much success. On 5 February
Tehran requested American assistance in
securing its eastern border.8 Two days later,
in an attempt to demonstrate their good
will, Iranian authorities arrested non-Afghan
Taliban crossing the Iranian border.9 A g a i n
on 10 February Iran closed the offices in Iran
of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, an Afghan warlord
and opponent of the Karzai Government.1 0
President Bush has tried to use the politi-
cal capital gained by Washington from the
11 September tragedy to build an interna-
tional consensus against Iranian WMD pro-
liferation. Washington's public reasoning is
that Iran 'could provide these arms to terror-
ists, giving them the means to match their
h a t r e d . '1 1 Washington's demands ignore
Iran's need to defend itself against Ameri-
can, Israeli, Pakistani, Russian and, poten-
tially, Iraqi WMD threats. 
On the issue of the Israel-Palestine conflict
both Iran and the US have room to manoeu-
vre. The Bush administration and the con-
gressional leadership face formidable pres-
sure from the pro-Israeli lobby in Washing-
ton and the right wing of the Republican
Party to contain and punish Iran. Similarly
Iran's elected government faces strong
pressure from the Iranian theocracy to op-
pose Israel's occupation of Palestine. It re-
mains to be seen whether either govern-
ment has the will or the power to resist such
pressure. 
Future prospects
There is, however, some hope of renewed
Iranian-American cooperation because of a
concurring interest in deposing Saddam
Hussein's regime in Iraq. As the US moves to
build support for a move against Hussein, it
will undoubtedly ask for Iranian coopera-
tion, as it did during the 1991 Persian Gulf
War. Iran will more than likely cooperate in
such an operation, as it did in 1991, but con-
flict may again arise over competing inter-
ests in a post-Hussein Iraq, as it has in
Afghanistan. 
Iran, the most populous nation in West
Asia, sitting astride the Persian Gulf and the
Caspian Sea, will play a central role in assur-
ing security in the region. Tehran cannot
abandon a role in Afghanistan as Washing-
ton requests, for to do so would be to relin-
quish control over its eastern border. Nor
can Iran ignore the proliferation of WMD in
West Asia and the threat that such weapons
pose to its national security. Progress re-
quires the American foreign policy commu-
nity to recognize these Iranian interests as
legitimate. It will also require the elected
leadership in Tehran and Washington to
overcome pressure from their domestic op-
ponents on the issue of the Israel-Palestine
conflict. Only when the two states perceive
their interests, not cultures, to be aligned
can any progress be made in Iranian-Ameri-
can relations. 
N o t e s
1 . Robert D. Kaplan, 'Looking the World in the Eye',
The Atlantic Monthly 288, n. 5 (December 2001): 82.
2 . This is paraphrased from the term 'Fascism with
an Islamic Face' coined by Christopher Hitchins in
his 'Against Rationalization', The Nation,
8 October 2001.
3 . 'Iran Arms 1,000 Basijis to Fight Afghan Bandits',
Tehran Times, 10 January 2001, 3.
4 . Vernon Loeb, 'Footprints in Steppes of Central
Asia', The Washington Post, 9 February 2002, A01.
5 . George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence,
'Worldwide Threat – Converging Dangers in a
Post 9/11 World' (testimony before the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence) Washington
D.C., 6 February 2002. For full text see
h t t p : / / w w w . c i a . g o v / c i a / p u b l i c _ a f f a i r s / s p e e c h e s /
dci_speech_02062002.html 
6 . Amy Waldman, 'In Louder Voices, Iranians Talk of
Dialogue with U.S.', The New York Times,
1 0 December 2002, 12.
7 . Karen DeYoung and Bradley Graham, 'President
Warns Iran on Afghanistan Efforts',
T h e Washington Post, 11 January 2002, A12. 
8 . Neil MacFarquahar, 'Tehran Says U.S. Should Offer
Assistance, Not Accusations', The New York Times,
6 January 2002. 
9 . The Associated Press, 'Iran Holding Taliban
Supporters', The New York Times, 7 February 2002.
10. Neil MacFarquahar, 'Tehran Shuts Offices of
Afghan Hard-Liner as Calls to Expel Him Increase',
The New York Times, 11 February 2002.
1 1 . President George W. Bush, 'State of the Union
Address', 29 January 2002, Washington, D.C.
F o r the text of his remarks see
h t t p : / / w w w . w h i t e h o u s e . g o v / n e w s / r e l e a s e s / 2 0 0 2 /
0 1 / 2 0 0 2 0 1 2 9 - 1 1 . h t m l
For more details please refer to Roham Alvandi's
forthcoming work, 'Iranian-American Relations after
September 11: Clash of Civilisations or Clash of
Interests', Journal of Contemporary Analysis,
v o l . 74, no. 2.
Roham Alvandi is an honorary research associate
a t the Research Institute for Asia and the Pacific,
University of Sydney, Australia.
E-mail: r.alvandi@riap.usyd.edu.au
